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 ABSTRACT:  Meno’s Thesis —the idea that knowing something is better than merely 
having a true belief about it—is incompatible with the joint claims that (a) believing the 
truth is the sole source of the value of knowledge and (b) true belief and knowledge are 
equally successful in believing the truth. Recent answers to that so-called “swamping” 
problem reject either (a) or (b). This paper rejects Meno’s Thesis instead, as relying on 
a confusion between expected value and value proper. The proposed solution relies on 
an externalist view of rationality, which is presented. 
 RÉSUMÉ:  La thèse du Ménon —l’idée que savoir quelque chose est meilleur que d’avoir 
une croyance vraie à ce sujet—est incompatible avec la conjonction des affi rmations 
que (a) croire le vrai est la seule source de valeur de la connaissance et (b) la croyance 
vraie et la connaissance ont des niveaux égaux de réussite en termes de croire le vrai. 
Des réponses récentes à ce «problème de la submersion» rejettent (a) ou (b). Cet 
article rejette au contraire la thèse du Ménon, comme reposant sur une confusion entre 
valeur espérée et valeur proprement dite. La solution proposée repose sur une théorie 
externaliste de la rationalité, qui est présentée. 
 Knowledge is a good thing. That fact appears readily explainable. Knowing 
something entails having the truth. Having the truth is a good thing. So knowing 
is a good thing. 
 This explanation faces a diffi culty, as pointed out by Plato in the  Meno (97b–d). 
One may have true belief without having knowledge. One might have guessed 
rightly, for instance. But having a true belief is no less having the truth than 
knowing. So, knowing would not be better than merely having a true belief. 
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Yet knowledge  does appear better than true belief. Knowing that a storm is a 
coming, for instance, appears better than merely guessing that a storm is 
coming. The simple explanation appears to fail. 
 We have the makings of a paradox: knowledge is good only because it is 
good to have the truth; merely believing the truth is no less having the truth 
than knowing; yet it is better to know than to have a true belief. Call this 
 Meno’s Paradox, and call the thesis that knowledge is better than true belief 
 Meno’s Thesis . 1 
 A variant of the paradox—the so-called “Swamping Problem”—has sparked 
a debate on the value of knowledge in the recent literature. Most of the contrib-
utors accept a qualifi ed version of Meno’s Thesis, according to which knowl-
edge is at least most often better than true belief. In this paper, I put forward a 
radically opposed solution which denies that knowledge is better than mere 
true belief. 
 The core idea of the proposal is that knowledge has a higher expected value 
than a mere true belief. More precisely, as far as the value of believing the truth 
is concerned, the expected value of believing what one believes is higher when 
one knows than when one has a true belief. The result relies on a certain exter-
nalist picture of rationality according to which rational expectations are ones 
based on knowledge and not simply belief. (This raises the worry that I am 
assuming what is to be explained, a worry that is defused in due course.) The 
result explains why one ought to prefer believing when one knows to believing 
when one merely believes. In that sense, knowledge is preferable to true belief. 
That, I think, is all there is to the intuition behind Meno’s Thesis. Hence, the 
proposal suggests that Meno’s Thesis relies on a confusion between expected 
value and value proper. It thus puts the burden of proof on those who think that 
knowledge is not only preferable to true belief, but genuinely better. 
 The paper is structured as follows. The fi rst section states Meno’s Paradox 
and the Swamping Problem. Section two reviews the existing solutions. They 
are “liberal” in the sense of upholding Meno’s Thesis and in being generous 
in their ascriptions of value to knowledge. Section three puts forward the 
“austere” solution I favour which rejects Meno’s Thesis entirely. 
 1.  Meno’s Paradox on the Value of Knowledge 
 1.1.  Meno’s Thesis 
 Let us start with the idea that knowledge is a good thing. It can be stated as 
follows: 
 VK For any fact  p , knowing that  p is a good thing. 
 The thesis has some initial plausibility—as opposed to parallel claims about 
belief or desire, for instance—but it faces counterexamples. Some knowledge 
is useless. Knowing whether the XII th century Catalan king, Ramon Berenguer 
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IV, was faithful to his wife Petrolina of Aragon would not help me with any 
past, present or future, or practical or theoretical, aim of mine. Some knowl-
edge is uninteresting. Medieval gossip is intrinsically interesting to many, but 
the same cannot be said about whether one’s local directory contains an even 
number of digits. Some knowledge is harmful, in practical or theoretical 
respects. Some unlucky witnesses get killed. A misleading piece of informa-
tion may put an inquiry on a wrong track. 
 Three mutually compatible amendments of VK can be introduced to deal 
with the counterexamples. First, we may restrict the claim to interesting facts: 
 VK-I For any interesting fact  p , knowing that  p is a good thing. 2 
 If to say that a fact is interesting is just to say that it is good to know it, the 
claim is tautologous. VK-I plausibly assumes that we have an independent 
notion of interesting facts. Second, we may make a generic claim instead of a 
universal one: 
 VK-G In general, knowing something is a good thing. 3 
 Generality allows for exceptions. What it requires is not entirely clear: it may 
neither be necessary nor suffi cient that most instances of the claim hold. 
Perhaps normal or typical instances should hold. We can leave the question 
aside here. 4 Third, we can construe VK as a claim about  ceteris paribus value 
as opposed to value “all things considered”. 
 VK-CP For any  p , knowing  p is a good thing, everything else being equal. 5 
 While knowing something may be a good thing, other things being equal, if it 
gets one in trouble, it may be a bad thing overall. 
 One should carefully distinguish  ceteris paribus value from  prima facie 
value. The former is a component of a thing’s total value. The second is merely 
an appearance of value. If a fl at is located in a nice area, that makes it valuable, 
everything else being equal. But if the rent is so high that it would ruin you, it 
is altogether a bad fl at for you. Still its location remains a positive component 
of its overall value. By contrast, the fact that the fl at you rent for a winter holiday 
is equipped with central heating is  prima facie a good thing. But upon realizing 
that the central heating does not work and will not be repaired during your stay, 
the appearance of value vanishes. It is not as if the fact that it is equipped with 
central heating still confers it some  ceteris paribus value that is simply offset 
by its not working. Rather, the fl at appeared to have some value that it does not 
in fact have.  Prima facie value is not value at all. 
 Whether knowledge of uninteresting facts is valuable is unclear. If it is not, 
then the restriction to interesting facts is needed. Here, we sidestep the issue by 
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focusing on interesting facts. The generic and  ceteris paribus amendments are 
each able to deal with the other counterexamples. 
 Meno’s Thesis is the view that knowledge is better than true belief. Its variants 
parallel those of the idea that knowledge is a good thing. 
 1.2.  Meno’s Paradox 
 We want the truth. Typically, someone who raises a question does not want to 
hear a beautiful or coherent story. They want to get the true answer. 
 But what does “having” or “getting” the truth mean? I write “she loves me” 
and “she loves me not” on two pieces of paper. Necessarily, I have a piece of 
paper that states the truth. But I do not thereby “have the truth” in the required 
sense. Having the truth in the desired sense could be either “believing the truth 
(and only the truth)” or “knowing”. Meno’s Paradox arises with the fi rst 
reading. We assume that believing the truth is good and try to explain on that 
basis why knowing is. 
 There are worries with the set-up. Is believing the truth a good thing? That 
is not obvious. Believing the truth generally favours success in action, but that 
is neither universal nor necessary. Success in action itself is at best valuable 
 ceteris paribus or generally. One may think that believing the truth is funda-
mentally good, but if one is entitled to that claim, why not just as well claim 
that knowing is fundamentally good? If it is, we need not explain its value in 
terms of the value of true belief. 6 
 These worries may be put aside dialectically. Meno’s Paradox challenges the 
simple explanation of the value of knowledge. Proponents argue that from the 
assumption that true belief is good, we cannot derive that knowledge is better. 
They may deny Meno’s Thesis or claim instead that knowledge is irreducibly 
valuable, or valuable on some other ground. Opponents argue that we can, so that 
knowledge is better than true belief if the latter is any good. The debate proceeds 
on the assumption that believing the truth is a good thing. We follow suit here. 
 Let us state the paradox more precisely. A “condition” is something a subject 
may or may not be in at a given time and world. 7 Feeling cold, getting to Larissa, 
knowing  p and believing the truth  p are examples of conditions. We say that a 
condition entails another if and only if, necessarily, a subject that is in the fi rst 
is in the second. We also need a graded condition of having true beliefs. We 
could say that one subject satisfi es this condition more than another if and only 
if the fi rst has more true beliefs than the second. But counting beliefs is of 
dubious value. For present purposes, we only need the limited and plausible 
assumption that if the truths believed by one subject entail those believed by 
another but not conversely, the fi rst satisfi es the condition more than the latter. 
The paradox is stated: 
 Evaluation Principle (EP): If conditions  C and  C ’ are good solely in virtue of how 
much satisfaction of graded condition  C ’’ they entail, and if each entails as much 
satisfaction of  C ’’ as the other, then  C and  C ’ are equally good. 
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 Truth Sole Source of Value (TSSV): Knowing that  p and believing the truth  p are 
good solely in virtue of how much satisfaction of the condition of having true beliefs 
they entail. 
 Equal Theoretical Success (ES): Knowing that  p and believing the truth  p entail as 
much satisfaction of the condition of having true beliefs as each other. 
 Meno’s Thesis (MT): Knowing that  p and believing the truth  p are not equally good. 
 The claims are logically contradictory. TSSV and ES entail that knowing 
 p and believing the truth  p satisfy the antecedent of EP, but MT contradicts its 
consequent. The formulation can be applied to the  ceteris paribus and “all 
things considered” readings of “good.” A generic version is obtained by 
substituting generic claims for the unrestricted ones. 
 The Evaluation Principle seems to me unassailable in all versions. So, one 
of TSSV, ES and MT has to go. Liberal solutions maintain MT and give up at 
least one of TSSV and ES. The austere solution I put forward rejects MT. 
 1.3.  The Swamping Problem 
 In recent literature, a debate on the value of knowledge has been sparked by the 
so-called “swamping problem.” (Jones,  1997 , 426; Zagzebski,  2003 ; Swinburne, 
 1999 , 58; Riggs,  2002 ; Kvanvig,  2003 , 44–9) The problem is a variant of 
Meno’s Paradox that involves a weaker “Truth Sole Source of Value” principle 
and a stronger “Equal Success” claim. 
 The “Truth Sole Source of Value” principle is very restrictive. It ascribes 
value to conditions only in virtue of their necessary consequences. An analogous 
principle in the practical domain would deny value to taking an aspirin even 
though it causes my headache to vanish because the effect of aspirin is contin-
gent. The principle denies that something can have instrumental value, insofar 
as instrumental value is value in virtue of its causal consequences. 
 It is not obvious that there is instrumental value. We have instrumental 
reasons to do things that have good consequences. But that does not imply that 
those things are good; only that they cause something good. So it is open to 
claim that while the condition of “taking a pill that will cure one’s headache” 
is a good condition, because it entails that one’s headache vanishes, the condition 
of taking a pill itself is not good. Hence, the necessary consequence version 
of Meno’s Paradox is defensible. We leave it aside for the moment, however, 
and consider whether the paradox survives the introduction of instrumental 
value. 8 
 People who accept instrumental value should be wary of a kind of double 
counting. To borrow an example from Parfi t ( 2011 , 59), suppose there are two 
apples in a tree. It is equally good for me to have either one, but the higher one 
can only be reached with a ladder. Using the ladder is therefore instrumentally 
good. Suppose I am only allowed to take one. One cannot say that it is better 
to take the higher one, because it has both the value of getting an apple  and the 
instrumental value of taking a ladder to get that apple. That is obviously wrong. 
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The instrumental value that a thing has in virtue of having some good conse-
quence cannot be added to the value of that consequence. 
 Let’s call consequentialism the idea that value is either intrinsic or instru-
mental. 9 There are several ways to formulate it. Here is one that will do for 
present purposes: The satisfaction of a condition by a particular subject at a 
particular time is an event. We remain neutral on whether the event in question 
exactly consists in the subject satisfying the condition, or is a more coarse-
grained entity. Some may want to distinguish direct and indirect causation, but 
we will ignore the distinction and say that an event causes another if and only 
if it causes directly or indirectly. If any event has parts, we include among its 
causal consequences the causal consequences of its parts, provided these con-
sequences are not already part of it. For instance, if the event of “the spark 
causing the fi re” includes both the event of “the spark,” which caused the fi re, 
and “the fi re” itself, that event did not cause the fi re. We assume that no event 
causes one of its own parts. We say: 
 Actual-Causal-Consequences Consequentialism (ACCC): The value of an event 
 E is equal to the sum of (a) the values that its parts have fundamentally and (b) the 
values that its causal consequences have fundamentally. Part (a) of the sum is the 
intrinsic value of  E and part (b) its instrumental value. 
 The principle avoids double counting. For instance, if  E includes  F and  G , 
 F causes  G and  G has fundamental value, then  F has instrumental value. But 
when evaluating  E , we should not add the instrumental value of  F to the value 
of  G , since the former is derived from the latter. The principle avoids that by 
computing the value of  E solely from the value of  G . Similarly, if  E causes  F , 
 F causes  G and  G has fundamental value, then  F has instrumental value. But 
when evaluating the  E , we should not add the value of  F to that of  G . Again, 
the principle avoids doing so. 
 Combined with veritism, the idea that only true belief has fundamental value 
in epistemic matters, consequentialism yields a consequentialist variant of 
the “Truth Sole Source of Value” principle. 10 The resulting version of Meno’s 
Paradox is the “swamping problem”: 
 Evaluation principle–consequentialist (EP–c): If events  E and  E ’ are good solely 
in virtue of the value of events of type  V that they include or cause, and if each 
includes or cause the same events of type  V as the other, then conditions  E and  E ’ are 
equally good. 
 Truth Sole Source of Value–consequentialist (TSSV–c): Events of knowing and of 
believing the truth are good solely in virtue of the value of the events of believing a 
truth they include or cause. 
 Equal Theoretical Success–consequentialist (ES–c): An event of knowing that 
 p and the corresponding event of believing the truth  p include or cause the same 
events of believing the truth as the other. 
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 Meno’s Thesis is as before, and the four claims are logically contradictory here 
as well. Again, EP–c seems unassailable, and one of TSSV–c, ES–c or Meno’s 
Thesis has to go. 
 A practical version of the paradox results from including good practical 
consequences as well as true beliefs in the source of value. That appears to 
be what Plato had in mind in the Meno. 
 The consequentialist version of “Truth Sole Source of Value” is weaker than 
the entailment one in the sense that it is more generous in its attribution of 
value. Accordingly, the consequentialist version of “Equal Success” is stronger: 
not only are the necessary consequences of knowledge and true belief the 
same, but their causal consequences are too. 
 The swamping problem has been aimed at reliabilism. In its simplest 
version, reliabilism about knowledge is the view that knowledge is reliably 
formed true belief. (Goldman,  1986 ) Reliably forming one’s belief on some 
occasion has instrumental value insofar as it causes one to form a true 
belief. But if knowing  p includes both reliably forming a belief about  p and 
having the true belief that  p , the value that accrues to reliably forming 
one’s belief in virtue of causing a true belief cannot be added to that of the 
true belief itself. Provided that one’s reliably forming that belief on that 
occasion does not cause further true beliefs, the Equal Success premise 
holds. The reliabilist then faces the consequentialist version of Meno’s 
Paradox. 
 2.  Liberal Solutions 
 Most current answers to Meno’s Paradox are liberal in that they endorse at least 
a qualifi ed version of Meno’s Thesis. As we will see, they all reject the entail-
ment version of “Truth Sole Source of Value”. They can be further classifi ed 
into those that reject consequentialist “Equal Success” and those that reject 
consequentialist “Truth Sole Source of Value”. 
 2.1.  Rejecting Consequentialist Equal Success 
 To reject the entailment version of Equal Success (ES), one has to argue that 
knowing  p necessarily entails having some true belief that believing  p does not. 
The prospects for such a claim are dim. For instance, a “Strong Higher-Order 
Belief Solution” would claim that knowing entails believing that one knows. 
Hence, knowing  p entails having two true beliefs, whereas having a true belief 
only entails having one: the true belief that  p and the true belief that one knows 
that  p . The solution is implausible since knowing does not require believing 
that one knows. 
 Defenders of Meno’s Thesis are therefore plausibly committed to rejecting 
the entailment version of “Truth Sole Source of Value”. They may reject either 
its consequentialist version as well or consequentialist Equal Success. We con-
sider the latter option here. The idea is that knowing has better consequences 
in terms of having true beliefs than simply having a true belief. 
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 Goldman and Olsson’s ( 2009 , 24–31) “Conditional Probability Solution” is 
one such view. They say that knowing generally makes it more probable that 
one has further true beliefs than simply having a true belief, in the following 
sense: the probability of having further true beliefs given that one knows that 
 p in a certain case is greater than the probability of having further true beliefs, 
given that one believes the truth  p in that case. That is so because knowing 
entails having reliably formed one’s belief, which typically goes with being 
able to reliably form further beliefs in the same way. 
 The proposal faces two problems. First, a consequentialist should use a 
notion of probability that is not only objective, as Goldman and Olsson 
( 2009 , 28) acknowledge, but also time-sensitive. Before the lottery is drawn, 
a ticket may have instrumental value because it has some chance of winning, 
but after the ticket lost, it no longer has any value. 11 On the time-sensitive 
notion of probability, past has probability one and conditionalising on it 
has no effect. Hence at the time of knowing, the probabilities given that one 
knows and given that one has a true belief are the same. Moreover, it is 
unclear why one should consider the probabilities at some other time, and if 
so, which. 
 Second, the proposal’s notion of instrumental value fails to distinguish 
means from symptoms. Suppose I need to take a certain drug that typically 
causes vomiting. The probability of me taking the drug conditional on me 
vomiting next week is higher than the unconditional probability of me taking 
the drug. Yet vomiting next week has clearly no instrumental value for taking 
the drug. Vomiting next week is an indication or symptom that I have taken the 
drug, not a means to it. Instrumental value should only accrue to means, not to 
symptoms. Goldman and Olsson’s solution faces a similar worry. Having reli-
ably formed a true belief that  p is a symptom of being disposed to form certain 
beliefs reliably. The disposition itself is a means to forming further true beliefs, 
not having reliably formed a true belief that  p . So while reliable dispositions 
typically have instrumental value beyond that of a single true belief, that is not 
obviously the case for instances of knowledge, which are mere symptoms of 
these dispositions. What Goldman and Olsson need to claim is that particular 
instances of reliable belief formation themselves cause or are likely to cause 
some further true beliefs. 12 
 Fortunately, events of knowing  p often appear to cause further true beliefs 
themselves. Such cases can be put forward against consequentialist “Equal 
Success”. Under a common interpretation, Plato’s “Tethering Solution” claims 
that acquiring knowledge that  p often causes one to maintain one’s true belief 
that  p in the face of misleading counter-evidence. (Williamson,  2000 , 78; 
Olsson, 2007) Swinburne’s ( 1999 , 64) “Higher-Order Belief Solution” claims 
that when acquiring knowledge, we typically acquire the true belief that we 
know and related higher-order beliefs. On a “Same-Order Belief” solution, 
one could point out that in acquiring one piece of knowledge, one typically 
acquires several related true beliefs. For instance, I acquire knowledge that 
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there is an apple in a basket by seeing it. In doing so, I acquire true beliefs 
about the content of the basket, the colour and shape of the apple, and 
so on. 
 Analogous remarks can be made about the practical success caused by 
knowledge to answer practical versions of Meno’s Paradox. (Williamson, 
 2000 , 62) 
 These solutions may be resisted. One could claim that in each case, further 
true beliefs are caused either by the acquisition of knowledge that  p —not by 
the state of knowing that  p itself—or by the corresponding true belief that  p . 
The objection turns on issues about the individuation of events of knowing and 
criteria for causation that we will not get into here. 13 
 If successful, these solutions show that consequentialist “Equal Success” is 
false. A further step is to argue that in general, knowledge is more successful 
than true belief. It is not straightforward to do so insofar as what generality 
requires is unclear. But if it can be done, a generic version of Meno’s Thesis 
can be vindicated. 
 These solutions cannot establish a universal version of Meno’s Thesis, 
however. It is easy to imagine cases in which one’s knowing  p has no fur-
ther consequences in terms of true beliefs or practical success. Hence an 
existential version of consequentialist “Equal Success” is hard to deny. 
Plugged into an existential version of the Meno’s Paradox, it yields the 
conclusion that in some cases , knowing is no better than the corresponding 
true belief. 
 The intuition behind Meno’s Thesis appears to be universal. A man on his 
deathbed wonders whether his son ever loved him. It appears better for him to 
come to know it on the basis of a reliable testimony than merely to believe the 
truth about it on the basis of a well-meaning friend’s guess. Yet that piece of 
knowledge does not have any good consequences that the true belief would not 
have. The present solutions cannot vindicate the judgement that that piece of 
knowledge is better than the true belief alone. 
 To sum up, these solutions argue that in general, knowing has good conse-
quences that having a true belief does not have. The claim is plausible and 
supports a generic version of Meno’s Thesis, insofar as the notion of instru-
mental value makes sense. But the intuition behind Meno’s Thesis is a universal 
one and they fail to vindicate or explain it. 
 2.2.  Denying Truth Sole Source of Value 
 Other solutions reject the idea that the value of knowledge entirely derives from its 
entailing or causing true beliefs. One may simply deny that the value of knowledge 
is at all explained in terms of the value of true belief. The “Fundamental Value 
Solution” is the simplest such option: on that view, knowledge simply has funda-
mental value, which is irreducible to that of true belief. However, most solutions in 
the literature hold onto the idea that the value of knowledge derives from that of 
true belief. They simply deny that it is explained by entailing or causing it. 
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 Goldman and Olsson’s ( 2009 , 31–5) “Value Autonomisation Solution” com-
bines two ideas: “type instrumentalism”, according to which something can 
have instrumental value in virtue of belonging to a relevant type of thing that 
generally has good consequences, and “value autonomisation”, according to 
which things of instrumentally valuable types sometimes come to be regarded 
as intrinsically valuable. The view is illustrated with the case of good inten-
tions. A particular good intention, they say, is seen to be good simply because 
good intentions generally have good consequences, and we end up regarding 
them as good in themselves. The proposal is that reliable belief formation—
and hence knowledge—comes to be regarded as intrinsically valuable, irrespective 
of whether it causes further true beliefs. 
 Both aspects of the proposal are problematic. Type instrumentalism seems 
wrong. (Piller,  2009a , 131–2) If aspirin cannot cure my current headache, then 
taking an aspirin will not cause it to vanish. On consequentialist views relying 
on actual causal consequences, taking aspirin has no instrumental value what-
soever in my case. 14 At most it appears to have value, precisely because it is an 
action of a type that typically cures headaches. That seems to me right. By 
contrast, type instrumentalists say that taking the aspirin does have some instru-
mental value. They have a hard time explaining why I should not bother taking 
the aspirin after I learn that my headache is of a kind that it cannot affect. 
 Second, value autonomisation sketches a psychological account of how we 
end up regarding merely some instrumentally valuable things as valuable in 
themselves. (Goldman and Olsson,  2009 , 34) The account answers the ques-
tion whether and why we value knowledge better than true belief, not whether 
knowledge is better than true belief. I fi nd the psychologisation of the problem 
unhelpful. It fails to distinguish error theories, according to which we value 
knowledge more than mere true belief but mistakenly so, from vindication 
theories, according to which we value knowledge more than mere true belief 
because it is better. 15 
 The “Value Autonomisation Solution” supports Meno’s Thesis only when 
construed as a vindication theory. To do so, one needs to assume that once we 
value knowledge intrinsically, knowledge becomes intrinsically valuable. In 
other words, one should endorse a kind of subjectivism about value. This point 
is controversial but defensible. At that stage the solution is in effect the “Fun-
damental Value Solution” supplemented with a genetic and subjectivist story 
of how knowledge comes to acquire fundamental value. 16 
 The “Credit Value Solution” defended by Riggs ( 2002 ), Greco ( 2003 ,  2010 ) 
and others has two components. First, they argue that a type of value, namely 
“credit”, occurs when some good arises from an agent’s ability. Typical illus-
trations come from sports: a skilful catch is better than one occurring through 
a fl uke. (Greco,  2003 , 122) By the same token, true belief arising from one’s 
ability is better than true belief  simpliciter . Second, they claim that knowledge 
is true belief arising from a subject’s ability. From this, a universal version of 
Meno’s Thesis follows. 
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 The solution faces three objections. First, not all knowledge may involve 
true belief arising from ability. Sometimes we want to fi nd answers, but some-
times we simply want to be given answers. In both cases, we would end up 
knowing, but situations most naturally described in the second way are harder 
to picture as true beliefs arising from one’s abilities. Testimony and calculators 
provide illustrations. If successful, they force credit theorists to retreat to a 
generic version of Meno’s Thesis. 17 Second, one may doubt whether knowl-
edge implies true belief arising from ability in a sense that yields credit value. 
Swallowing is a success arising from ability too, and we gain much perceptual 
knowledge quite like we swallow. One may doubt whether successful swal-
lowing is made better by the fact that it arises from an ability to do it. The doubt 
may be extended to knowledge we acquire in a quasi-automatic fashion. Again, 
that would force a retreat to a generic claim—but even that would be threat-
ened if knowledge is typically acquired in such a way. Third, one may reject 
the very idea of credit value. Alleged cases of credit value are explainable in 
other ways. In sports, for instance, we value good players at least as much as 
good results. A skilful catch may appear better because it indicates a good 
player. By contrast, not all goods become better when brought about by one’s 
ability. Suppose it would be good to clean the terrace in front of my house. If a 
rainfall happens to wash it, I should not regret not having done it myself. That 
is so even if the cleaning would have only involved effortlessly pushing a 
button. Hence, one may doubt that bringing about something good through 
one’s one ability carries any additional value. 
 Zagzebski’s ( 2003 ) “Good Motivation Solution” is a restrictive version of 
the “Credit” view. She takes credit to require a good resulting from one’s being 
motivated by the good. A boy that brings back a lost cat deserves credit if he 
aimed at being helpful, not if he only aimed at getting a reward. She says that 
knowledge is valuable when it is desirable true belief resulting from one’s 
virtuous intellectual acts motivated by a love of desirable truth (2003, 24). 
As she recognizes, the view only supports a generic version of Meno’s Thesis. 
(Ibid.) 
 Piller’s ( 2009a , 123–6; 2009b, 426) “Deontic Value Solution” claims that 
(a) one ought to choose what is likely to be good from one’s point of view, 
(b) choosing as one ought to is itself good. 18 Applied to belief, that means that 
one ought to form beliefs in ways that appear reliable from one’s point of view, 
and that true beliefs so formed will be better than mere true belief. 
 The solution in effect ascribes value to internally justifi ed true belief, and 
thus mismatches the universal Meno’s Thesis. Moreover, there is a worry that 
the notion of deontic value is inconsistent or undefi ned. Start from the totality 
of what is good, call it Good. One ought to choose what is likely good. On the 
deontic view, it follows that choosing the likely good is good as well. Now the 
good is not just Good, but Good and choosing what is likely good. So either Good is 
not the totality of the good, contrary to assumption, or Good self-referentially 
includes choosing the likely good, but I doubt such a notion is well-defi ned. 19 
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 To sum up, we reviewed four main options to deny “Truth Sole Source of 
Value”. The “Fundamental Value Solution” claims that knowledge is a funda-
mental good. The “Credit Value Solution” claims that knowledge has value 
as credit for something good, namely true belief. The “Good Motivation 
Solution” claims that knowledge has value when resulting from a motivation 
for something good, namely desirable true belief. The “Deontic Value Solution” 
claims that knowledge is good when it is believing as one ought to believe. The fi rst 
two can support a universal version of Meno’s Thesis. The latter two can at most 
support a generic version. The “Value Autonomisation Solution” is ambiguous 
between an error theory and a variant of the “Fundamental Value Solution”. 
 I have mentioned some diffi culties for these views, but they are not decisive. 
The generic version of Meno’s Thesis may be defended by denying that the 
universal one is intuitive or by endorsing some error theory about the intuition 
behind the universal one—along the lines of the “Value Autonomisation Solution”, 
for instance. The “Fundamental Value Solution” may appear unsatisfactory but 
I see no major problem with it. “Credit Value” theorists may have resources to 
answer the objections raised. 
 My aim here is not to establish that these views are wrong, however. Rather, 
I want to undercut their central motivation, namely to uphold Meno’s Thesis. 
To do this, I show how one can explain why one ought to prefer knowledge 
over mere true belief even if knowledge is not better than true belief. That 
knowledge is to be preferred to mere true belief seems to me all there is to 
explain in Meno’s Paradox. Hence, the explanation puts the burden of proof on 
those who want to argue that knowledge is not only preferable to true belief, 
but also better. 
 3.  An Austere Solution 
 In this section, I put forward an austere answer to Meno’s Paradox, the “Higher 
Expected Value” solution. It is austere in the sense that it rejects Meno’s Thesis 
entirely. That part is straightforward: we reject the notion of instrumental value 
and endorse the entailment version of “Truth Sole Source of Value”. As we 
have seen, the entailment version of “Equal Success” is overwhelmingly 
plausible. The full denial of Meno’s Thesis follows. 
 The main thrust of the solution is to explain why knowledge ought nevertheless 
to be preferred to mere true belief. The view relies on a certain externalist view of 
rationality, which I introduce fi rst. On the basis of that view, and the assumption 
that believing the truth is good, we can show that knowledge has a higher expected 
value of a certain kind. The higher expected value of knowledge explains why 
it ought to be preferred to mere true belief, in a sense that we will specify. That, 
I claim, is all there is to the intuition behind Meno’s Thesis. 20 
 3.1.  Two Pictures of Rationality 
 Let me fi rst contrast two pictures of rationality. 21 Both share the idea that facts 
give us reasons to act in certain ways and to be in certain states such as beliefs, 
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desires or emotions. (In introducing the two pictures we focus on acts, but what 
we say applies equally to states.) For instance, if eating walnuts would kill you, 
you have a reason not to eat walnuts, whether you are aware of it or not. (Parfi t, 
 2011 , 31) To reasons corresponds an objective use of “ought:” you ought not to 
eat walnuts, since they would kill you. (Broome,  2004 ) 
 The two pictures differ on how rationality relates to reasons. On the fi rst, 
which we may call internalist, the rationality of one’s acts depends only on 
one’s beliefs: one acts rationally if the truth of what one believes would give 
one suffi cient reason to act in that way. (Parfi t,  2011 , 111) The natural dividing 
line here is between true and false belief. One’s acts are rational if they 
adequately fi t one’s beliefs. If those beliefs are true in addition, one acts as one 
has reason to; if they are false, one typically does not. 
 On the second picture, which we will call externalist, we distinguish full 
rationality and internal rationality. Full rationality depends on knowledge, 
while internal rationality depends on belief. An act is fully rational if and only 
if the facts one knows give one suffi cient reason to act in that way. If one acts 
without knowing facts that give one suffi cient reason to act in that way, one’s 
act is not fully rational. What if one had every reason to believe something 
whose truth would give one a suffi cient reason, but that belief was false? 
A doctor uses a needle which is adequately marked as sterile but has been con-
taminated due to some rare blunder of which she is unaware. She does not 
know that the needle is safe, and still, is it not rational for her to use it? Not 
fully rational, on the present view, but excusable. The doctor’s act is wrong 
because she does not know that the needle is safe, but excusable because she 
could not know that she did not know it. (Hawthorne and Stanley,  2008 , 573) 
The natural dividing line here is between knowledge and mere belief. An act is 
internally rational if it fi ts one’s beliefs, but internally rational acts divide into 
fully rational ones based on known facts and excusable ones based on mere 
beliefs. 
 Three points bring out the contrast between the two pictures. First, there is a 
use of “ought” distinct from the objective one on which it is not the case that 
you ought to have helped me if you neither knew nor believed that I needed 
help. Call this the rational “ought”. The two pictures disagree on what one 
ought to do in that sense. On the internalist picture, someone who (mistakenly) 
believes that smoking protects their health ought to smoke. (Parfi t,  2011 , 115) 
This is not so on the externalist picture. Second, the difference between knowledge 
and true belief is superfi cial on the internalist picture but not on the externalist 
one. On the former, whether one knows or simply has a true belief makes no 
difference. Provided that one is rational, one is acting as one really has reason 
to in both cases. On the externalist picture, there is a crucial difference. Only 
knowledge allows one to act for the reasons one in fact has. (Hyman,  1999 ) In 
the true belief case, one at most acts as one has reasons to, but not for reasons 
one has, that is, one’s act matches the reasons one has but is not justifi ed nor 
explained by them. Third, the externalist sees differences in justifi cation among 
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internally rational acts that the internalist does not. On the externalist view, an 
internally rational act based on knowledge is fully justifi ed, while an internally 
rational act based on mere belief is at most fully excused. On the internalist 
picture, they are equally justifi ed. 
 3.2.  The Higher Expected Value of Knowledge 
 The answer to Meno’s Paradox I put forward endorses the externalist picture. 
The picture entails that one ought to prefer “believing when one knows” to 
“believing when one does not know”, even if both beliefs are equally valuable. 
To show that, we need two distinctions. 
 First, we need a distinction between value proper and expected value. Con-
sider the following case, due to Piller ( 2009a , 123): 
 You are given a choice between two bundles of lottery tickets, at no cost. The 
winning ticket is in one of the two bundles, but you have to way to know or guess 
which. The fi rst bundle contains 100 tickets, the other 10. As it happens, the winning 
ticket is in the smaller one. 
 Does the bigger bundle have any value? No, I submit. It will not get you a prize 
and a bundle of tickets is useless to you. Yet you ought rationally to take it. 
Why? Because it is the one you can most expect to have value. From your point 
of view, it is the one that is most likely to win the prize, that is, to have value. 
In short, we say that it has the highest expected value. But we should be clear 
that expected value is not value, just as an expected result is not a result. 22 
 Expected value is perspective-dependent in a way that value is not. Initially 
you should choose the bigger bundle; but if you later learn that it is a loser, you 
should not. That is not because it has some value that suddenly vanishes when 
you learn that, but because you expected it to have value but learned that it 
does not. 
 Second, we need a distinction between really expected value and merely 
apparently expected value. When facts one knows give one reasons to expect 
something, I say that one really expects that thing. When one has beliefs the 
truth of which would give one reason to expect something, I say that one 
apparently expects that thing. If those beliefs do not constitute knowledge, one 
merely apparently expects that thing. For instance, if a man is convinced that it 
will rain tomorrow by reading tea leaves, he merely apparently expects the 
rain, while a woman who is convinced by a good weather report really expects 
the rain. My use of “expect” is non-psychological. The man and the woman 
both have an attitude of expecting the rain. But in my use, the rain is only really 
expected by the woman. Expectations in my sense do not even require subjects 
to have an attitude of expecting. 23 
 In a probabilistic framework, we can defi ne real expectations as proba-
bilities given what one knows and apparent expectations as probabilities 
given what one believes. Merely apparent expectations arise when there is 
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a gap between the two. Known facts are a special case of real expectations: 
assuming that knowledge entails probability one, they are real expectations 
with certainty. 
 We now get the following result: 
 Knowledge has a Higher Really Expected Value For any  p , as far as the value of 
believing the truth about  p is concerned, the really expected value of  p to the knower 
(at the time of knowing) is always higher that it is to the mere believer (at the 
time of believing). 
 Let us say that the value of believing the truth about  p is one on some relevant 
scale. The value of a particular true belief that  p may vary widely depending on its 
implications. But as far as the value of believing the truth about  p is concerned, its 
 ceteris paribus value is one on the relevant scale. Now suppose that I currently 
know  p . What value should I expect believing  p to have? The question may appear 
a bit unnatural, since believing  p is not an act I can choose, and since I do in fact 
already believe  p . But it is well-defi ned nonetheless. Given what I know, the prob-
ability that I believe the truth about  p by believing  p is one. So as far as believing 
the truth about  p is concerned, the really expected value (to me, now) of believing 
 p is one. Now suppose that I do not currently know  p , though I believe it. What 
value should I expect believing  p to have? Given what I believe, the probability 
that I believe the truth by believing  p is one. So the apparently expected value 
(to me, now) of believing  p is one. But barring a few exceptional cases, the 
probability given what I know that I believe the truth about  p by believing  p is 
less than one. So the really expected value (to me, now) of believing  p is less 
than one. As far as the value of believing  p is concerned, the really expected 
value of believing  p to the knower at the time of knowing is higher than its 
really expected value to the mere believer at the time of believing. 24 
 Now on the externalist view of rationality, one ought to act and to be accord-
ing to facts known to one. In particular, one ought to prefer according to one’s 
really expected values, that is, according to what can be expected to be best 
given what one knows. But as we have shown, believing  p has a higher really 
expected  ceteris paribus value to the knower than to the believer. Hence nec-
essarily, one who knows  p ought to prefer believing  p and is fully rational 
in believing  p ,  ceteris paribus . By contrast, to one who merely believes  p , 
believing  p is not decisively preferable. 25 
 We thus have an explanation of why one ought to prefer believing when one 
knows over believing when one does not. To the knower, one’s current belief 
that  p is the one she maximally ought to prefer having,  ceteris paribus . To the 
mere believer, one’s current belief that  p is not maximally the one she ought to 
prefer having,  ceteris paribus . The  ceteris paribus clauses indicate that these 
claims are restricted to what pertains to the value of believing the truth about 
 p . Note that the explanation essentially relies on the externalist picture. On the 
internalist view, both would believe as they rationally ought to. 
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 The explanation puts pressure on defenders of Meno’s Thesis. It only 
assumes that believing the truth has value and it is compatible with the denial 
that knowledge has any more value than true belief. It nevertheless explains 
why it is  ceteris paribus rational to prefer knowledge over mere true belief, in 
the sense that one ought to prefer believing when one knows. 26 But I doubt 
there is anything more to the intuition behind Meno’s Thesis than the idea that 
knowledge is  ceteris paribus universally preferable to mere true belief. Hence 
the explanation puts a burden of proof on those who claim that knowledge also 
genuinely better than mere true belief. 
 3.3.  The Perspective Worry and the Circularity Worry 
 Let me discuss two worries for the “Higher Expected Value” solution. Throughout 
the discussion, we omit the qualifi cations that a belief’s “value” and “prefera-
bility” refer to its value and preferability insofar as believing the truth about 
the proposition believed is concerned, and that “expectation” refers to one’s 
real expectations. 
 First, the “Perspective Worry”. We have shown that knowledge is preferable 
to mere true belief to the knower at the time of knowing. But knowing appears 
preferable even when viewed from the past or the future. Can we explain that? 
Several replies can be made. First, the expected value of knowledge is plausibly 
generally higher. The expectation that one will believe the truth is higher, if one 
acquires knowledge than if one reads tea leaves. But that holds in general only; 
in particular, it does not apply to past mere true belief which is presently known 
to be true. Second, one may argue that being fully rational has value in itself. 
Since knowing implies a  ceteris paribus fully rational belief while mere true 
believing does not, knowing has higher expected value from all perspectives. 
That is in effect Piller’s “Deontic Value” solution. As we have seen, its consistency 
is dubious. Third, one may appeal to Broome’s ( 1999 ) idea that in addition to 
aiming at what has most value, rationality requires various forms of coherence 
such as intending the means to one’s ends or believing that one will do what 
one intends to do. Those requirements stand on their own and do not derive 
from or imply a value of being coherent. We may think that they include the 
requirement to prefer one’s future and past self to be rational. Insofar as having 
a mere true belief is being in a state that does not maximally fi t one’s real 
expectations, it is a less than fully rational state. Rationality would thus require 
preferring not to be in such a state at any time. Obviously, the idea needs to be 
worked out in more detail. But the line seems to me promising. 
 Second, the “Circularity” worry. The externalist picture of rationality I am 
relying on puts a heavy normative load on the difference between true belief 
and knowledge. Is it not circular to assume it while trying to explain why 
knowledge is preferable to true belief? It would be so if the fact that one ought 
to prefer according to what one knows—rather than according to what one 
truly believes—was itself explained by the fact that knowing is preferable 
to having a mere true belief. But it is not. In fact, even if we assumed that 
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knowledge was not only preferable to but better than having a mere true 
belief, that would hardly explain why we ought to act in the light of our 
knowledge rather than our beliefs or true beliefs. The normative role of 
knowledge is either primitive or explained otherwise. Hence the solution is 
not circular. 
 That being said, the solution is conditional on the view that knowledge does 
play a special normative role that mere true belief does not play. I am fairly 
optimistic about its prospects, but it is beyond the scope of the present paper to 
defend it. 27 
 4.  Conclusion 
 When one knows, one ought to believe what one believes. When one has a mere 
true belief, one ought not to believe what one believes. Or, more cautiously: 
it is not the case that one maximally ought to believe what one believes. There 
are several routes to those claims. The one we followed did not assume that 
knowledge was the aim of belief or that it had more value than true belief. 
Rather, it simply assumed that believing the truth was a good thing and it 
endorsed a view of rationality on which one ought to act and to be according to 
what can be expected on the basis of what one knows. Thus we can explain 
why knowledge ought to be (universally,  ceteris paribus ) preferred to true 
belief without claiming that it is better than true belief. That is the “Higher 
Expected Value Solution” to Meno’s Paradox. 
 The solution leaves several issues open. First, it assumes an externalist pic-
ture of rationality on which knowledge plays a central normative role that true 
belief does not play. This view needs further exploration and defence. Second, 
it remains to be seen whether the solution can explain why past and future 
knowledge ought to be preferred over mere true belief. We have outlined an 
option that appeals to requirements of rationality that are neither based on nor 
implying values, but such requirements are controversial. 
 However, the proposal is substantial enough to put pressure on defenders of 
Meno’s Thesis. In particular, it puts pressure on solutions to Meno’s Paradox 
that introduce novel kinds of derived value such as type instrumental value, 
credit value or deontic value. In the light of our solution, such notions are suspect 
of confusing expected value and value proper. 28 
 Notes 
  1  The label  Meno’s Paradox is commonly used for an unrelated puzzle also stated in 
the Meno (80d). 
  2  See Sosa ( 2001 ), Kvanvig ( 2008 ) and Piller ( 2009b) for further discussion. 
  3  See Jones ( 1997 , 434). 
  4  See Leslie ( 2008 ) for further discussion. 
  5  See Kvanvig ( 2008 , 201–2). Kvanvig’s terminology of  “prima facie value” and his 
analogy with defeasible reasoning tends to confuse  ceteris paribus value proper 
with  prima facie appearance of value. We clarify the distinction below. 
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  6  For further discussion of the value of true belief and a defence of the idea that it is 
a fundamental good, see Kvanvig ( 2003 , Chap. 2). 
  7  See Williamson ( 2000 , 52). 
  8  See Piller ( 2009a , 125) for further discussion. On his view the very fact that instru-
mental “value” raises double counting issues (see below) indicates that it is not 
value at all. 
  9  Not all notions of consequentialism in the literature fi t that defi nition. 
  10  See Goldman and Olsson ( 2009 , 24) on the idea that the swamping problem assumes 
veritism. 
  11  On the stricter, actualist notion of instrumental value sketched in the previous 
section, a ticket that does not win has not and  did not have instrumental value at any 
point. It merely had a chance of having instrumental value. Goldman and Olsson’s 
solution relies on a more liberal version of consequentialism. 
  12  Piller ( 2009a , 128–9) makes related points. But I would not endorse his claim that 
one is equally likely to form further true beliefs given Goldman and Olsson’s 
assumptions alone than given these assumptions and the fact that one has formed a 
true belief reliably. 
  13  See Williamson ( 2000 , 2.4 and 3.4-3-7) for a useful discussion. 
  14  The same holds for consequentialist views relying on objectively probable causal 
consequences. 
  15  Goldman and Olsson’s ( 2009 , 34) defence of the psychological shift is unclear to 
me. They fi rst claim that our evidence on the value of knowledge wholly consists in 
intuitions about its value — an objectionable claim, but let it pass here. They then 
say that (a) we are not methodologically entitled to assume that our intuitions track 
the facts, though they do not want to deny it either, and (b) if these intuitions are 
misguided, “the epistemological enterprise needn’t collapse”. What they mean by 
“epistemological enterprise” is presumably what the following sentences refer to 
as “explaining epistemic intuitions” and “understanding the sources of epistemic 
intuitions”. As they rightly point out, that project “may profi t from understanding 
human psychology”. 
   These comments seem to amount to the following: even if Meno’s Thesis turns out 
to be false, it is worth explaining why we fi nd it appealing. In short, error theories 
are available. Indeed, it is natural to construe their solution as an error theory 
explaining how we end up valuing intrinsically some valueless means—as Piller 
( 2009a , 132) points out, Mill gives just such a story about money. ( Utilitarianism , 
chap. 4, 36) Yet Goldman and Olsson ostensibly introduce these points in defence 
of the idea that human psychology can shed light on a question that “concerns 
objective value, not how people  assign valuational status”, namely “whether a state 
of affairs with the status of being merely instrumentally good can objectively 
change its status to being non-instrumentally, or fundamentally, good” . (Ibid.) I fail 
to see how their points support that unless they mean that human psychology “sheds 
light” on the question negatively, by explaining away judgements of objective 
value. Be that as it may, they then describe value autonomisation in ways that can—
but need not—be construed non-psychologically: “some states of affairs that at one 
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time are assigned merely instrumental value are  ‘promoted’ to the status of inde-
pendent, or fundamental, value” (34), “while many such processes are originally 
regarded as merely instrumentally valuable to true-belief attainment, they are later 
 upgraded to the status of independent value.” (35; my italics) “Promoted” and 
“upgraded” can equally denote an objective change in value or a mere change in 
our judgements of value. 
   In the end, Goldman and Olsson appear aware that the autonomisation story can 
be construed as either an error or vindication theory but they seem to try to avoid 
commitment either way. That leaves unclear whether they ultimately endorse 
Meno’s Thesis. Goldman ( 2011 , §4) gives it a clear vindication reading, however. 
  16  See Parfi t ( 2011 , Chap. 3) for a characterisation and criticism of subjectivism about 
value. As it is formulated, Goldman and Olsson’s solution would only lead to the 
claim that reliably formed true belief is better than true belief. If reliably formed 
true belief is not suffi cient for knowledge, this falls short from showing that knowl-
edge itself is better. But the story is easy to adapt to reach the latter conclusion, by 
starting from the remark that knowing is a good means to believe the truth. 
  17  See Lackey ( 2004 ) and Greco ( 2010 , 80–4) for a reply. 
  18  Piller does not say whether likelihood given one’s point of view is likelihood given 
what one knows or what one believes. He uses the indeterminate term “awareness” 
(2009a, 134). 
  19  A related issue is that the Deontic Value view warrants a regress in what one ought 
to do. Start from some good. One ought to choose the likely good. But then choosing 
the likely good is itself good. So one ought to choose the likely (good and choosing 
the likely good). But that itself is now good, and so on. 
  20  The solution agrees with Piller’s ( 2009a) on several points, notably on the idea that 
the fact that knowledge is preferable to true belief is not grounded in knowledge’s 
being better than true belief. (Piller,  2009a , 123) But they disagree on others: Piller’s 
solution is internalist (2009a, 134) and liberal (2009a, 126), while the “Higher 
Expected Value Solution” is externalist and austere. 
  21  I label the two pictures “internalist” and “externalist”, respectively. They have some 
affi nity with the internalist/externalist divide set up by Williamson ( 2000 , esp. §2.1, 
§8.7, §9.1, §9.3). But it is beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss whether 
they refl ect the various “internalist/externalist” divides of the literature. The reader 
who fi nds my labels misleading is urged to ignore them. 
  22  In decision theory, representation theorems show that an agent meeting certain 
conditions of rationality prefers acts that have the highest expected utility, where the 
latter is computed on the basis of her preferences over possible outcomes and her 
expectations of each act to have these outcomes. The result is often summarized 
in the claim that the utility of an act is its expected utility. If utility was value, that 
would contradict the idea that expected value is not value. But as the spelled out 
version makes clear, the theorem is about rational preferences, not value. Utility is 
thus better understood as rational preferability rather than value. When values are 
known, things are rationally preferred according to their values. When values 
are not known, things are rationally preferred according to their expected value. 
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The notion of utility ignores the distinction. For instance, a rational agent may be 
indifferent between a ticket that returns $1 for sure and a ticket that she judges to 
be 1/10 likely to return $10 and nothing otherwise. In decision-theoretic terms, the 
utility of the two tickets is the same for her. But that does not mean that their  value 
is the same. In fact, she knows that their value is different: the second is either 
worthless or ten times better than the fi rst. Only their expected value is the same. 
See Piller ( 2009b , 423–5) for further discussion. 
  23  A less ambiguous term may have been preferable, but I know of none. 
  24  The exceptions are cases in which the probability of believing the truth by believing 
 p given what one knows is one, even though one does not know  p itself. First, there 
is the case of a mere believer who knows things that entail  p without knowing 
 p itself. She fails to draw the consequence from what she knows but believes  p on 
other grounds. Second, in some cases involving infi nite numbers of outcomes, the 
probability of  p given what one knows can be one even though what one knows 
fails to entail  p . For instance, it is often assumed that the probability that one will 
 not pick the (geometrical) mid-point of a line given that one picks a point (genu-
inely) randomly on it is one. In my view the cases refl ect a limit of the probabilistic 
framework rather than a limit in the present argument. When  p is a consequence of 
what one knows that one has failed to draw, one does not really expect  p in the way 
that one does if one knows  p . Similarly, if probability one is not enough for knowledge, 
then one does not really expect  p when  p is merely probability one given what 
one knows in the way that one does if one knows  p . Be that as it may, we can ignore 
these exceptional cases in the present discussion. 
 25  How far one still ought to believe  p and whether one is still fully rational in 
believing  p in cases in which one merely believes  p depends on the disvalue of 
believing the false about  p of the value of suspending judgement. If suspending 
judgement has no value and the disvalue of believing the false is fi nite, there will 
be cases in which one known facts give one most reason to believe  p — as far as 
believing the truth about  p is concerned. But there is still a contrast between that 
case and the case of the knower. In the case of the knower, believing  p is absolutely 
preferable insofar as believing the truth about  p is concerned, while in the case of 
the mere believer, it is only relatively preferable. 
  26  If knowing has the same value as believing truly, then the expected value of knowl-
edge cannot be higher than that of true belief—on the plausible assumption that one 
always expects believing at least as much as knowing, since the latter entails the 
former. In that sense our result is not strictly speaking that one ought to prefer 
knowing over believing truly. It is that one ought to prefer one’s belief when one 
knows to one’s belief when one merely believes. Belief that constitutes knowledge 
ought to be preferred to belief that does not, not because knowing itself has more 
expected value, but because believing has more expected value when one knows. 
  27  See Hawthorne and Stanley ( 2008 ) for a defence of that role with respect to action. 
 28  Thanks to Anne Meylan, Pascal Engel, Fabian Dorsch, Stephane Lemaire, and 
audiences at Amsterdam, Fribourg, the Logos research group (Barcelona) and 
Rennes for useful discussions of the ideas of this paper. 
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